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The Migration-Development Nexus: Toward a Transnational Perspective Thomas Faist and Margit Fauser The nexus between migration and development has once again found entry into public debate and academic research in connection with the mobility of persons and issues of economic and socio-political development. This is to say, interest in the topic is currently resurging after peaking twice previously, in the 1960s and the 1980s. The current enthusiasm around migrants as agents of development reflects a paradigm which holds that migration can produce beneficial outcomes for both emigration and immigration countries. Current discussions, however, often reflect little memory of previous debates. In particular, scant systematic thought is given to what is 'new' this time around.
The contributions to this book argue that the current enthusiasm about the migration-development nexus should be approached from a transnational perspective that recognizes the emergence of a new agent in development discourse, variably called 'migrants', 'diaspora' or 'transnational community'. A transnational perspective, thus, is one which captures both the cross-border ties and engagements these actors sustain and the role played by institutions on the local, national and global level, including international organizations such as the World Bank, national states and organizations in development cooperation. Increasingly, the cross-border ties of geographically mobile persons and collectives have been receiving great attention with respect to development cooperation. Governments and inter-and supra-national organizations seek to co-opt and establish ties with these agents, who are engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border relationships on a personal, collective and organizational level. Addressing this new type of development agent from a decidedly transnational perspective allows us to look at what is usually called 'development' in both the North and the South. Instead of repeating the 'new mantra' (Ratha, 2003) of migration and development, which is simply a rehash of previous debates in familiar terms, it is necessary to seek a deeper understanding of current constellations. Two dimensions seem crucial here: first, the macro-structural factors and paradigms in which current debates and new policies are embedded, and second, the meso-level phenomena of transnational actors and associated transfers beyond the limited but dominating focus on financial remittances. This book thus offers an analysis of new agents in various fields of transnational activities such as knowledge networks, post-conflict and development engagement of diasporas, migrant organizations and transnational business activities, and the structures and ongoing social transformations in which agency is embedded.
New enthusiasm and open questions
The new enthusiasm around migration and development rests on a number of strong claims and thereby raises relevant questions which are hardly discussed. These claims can be summarized in the statement that migration and the resultant remittances migrants send 'back home' (that is, the flows of money, knowledge, and universal ideas) can have a positive effect on what is called development. Obviously, this is not a new insight. It has been part of familiar debates that have been on the public and academic agendas on and off at least since the 1960s. However, this positive evaluation of the nexus between migration and development has gained great appeal in the past few years. The first claim is that financial remittances carry a huge potential for poverty reduction and local business and infrastructure investment. This statement is supported by the observation that remittances very often are resistant or even counter-cyclic to economic recession. Several studies have suggested that remittances often keep on flowing from immigration to emigration contexts despite recession in the country of immigration (such as Ratha, 2003) . Even more strikingly, the amount of remittances transferred to developing countries through officially sanctioned channels, such as banks or money transfer services, has increased sharply over the past several years -from about US$40 billion in 1990 to US$167 billion in 2005, up to US$338 billion in the year 2008 (IOM, 2005, p. 270; World Bank, 2009) . Although in 2008 total net official development assistance (ODA) from members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reached its highest figure ever recorded -at US$119.8 billion (OECD, 2009) , officially recorded remittance flows are still three times higher.
Second, despite the fact that financial remittances still stand at its core, in this new round of enthusiasm strong emphasis has been placed on the transfer of skills, knowledge, and social remittances from the North to the South. With such a shift in perspective, the perception of the costs and benefits of migration has also changed. Over the course of many years, in particular during the 'brain drain' of the 1970s, the loss of skilled personnel educated and trained in emigration countries in the South and their movement to the North without proper compensation, was one of the main concerns of development agencies and emigration-side governments. In the 1990s and 2000s the consequences of knowledge transfer have been re-coined into 'brain gain'. Nowadays, there are supposedly more win-win situations for mobile persons, states and societies on the different sides of the migratory process (Doyle, 2004) . In addition, current debates hinge upon the newer concept of 'social' remittances, referring to the flow of ideas and practices (Levitt, 1998) . In this interpretation social transfers shall promote development given that they are 'good' since they are related to modernity and modern development, reflected in human rights, gender equity, and democracy, to name only the most obvious ones. Third, part of the 'new mantra' is the desirability of temporary labour migration based on the expectation that temporary migrants will constitute no loss in human capital and furthermore transmit a higher percentage of their income than permanent immigrants. This view was prominently propounded by the Global Commission on International Migration in its 2005 report (GCIM, 2005) . Recent efforts have taken this notion further, in particular with the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006, and the recent report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2009).
Cutting across all forms of remittances, it is not only recent labour migrants who are thought to remit but also settled migrants. Moreover, there has been a shift from considering return to the country of origin as the best way of contributing to development, to other perspectives on migrants settled in immigration countries who return temporarily on short or extended visits -for example, professionals in the scientific realm who transmit their knowledge. Overall, these three broad claims are tied to migration management and control. It is the hope expressed in many policy documents and official statements by political institutions such as the European Commission (2005) that, in the long run, economic growth supported in part by financial, knowledge and social remittances will reduce 'migration pressure' in the sending countries. Yet, even a cursory glance at this new enthusiasm casts doubt on this optimistic agenda and points to at least two broad questions.
The first question is: what has changed in the thinking about the migration-development nexus? In fact, after decades of research, there is a consensus regarding the consequences of migration on development, at least among economists: while the economic impacts undoubtedly 'have positive effects' for receiving countries, and most powerfully for OECD countries, it is also agreed that the benefits for sending countries are less clear-cut and heavily contested among both agents in the field of development cooperation and in academic research (cf. Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, Chapter 3 in this volume). Most studies analysing socio-economic changes in emigration regions conclude that development in the countries of origin is not a result of migration and resultant remittances and investments by migrants. Rather, development -along with the right political and institutional conditions -is a prerequisite for migrants to invest and to remit meaningfully (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008) . Given the fact that current knowledge does not allow for simple and uniform conclusions about the potentials of migration for developing countries, the question arises as to what is peculiar in this phase of the thinking on the nexus compared to previous ones.
The second question concerns the structural-political constellations which explain the recent rise in attention and literal euphoria on the migration-development nexus at this particular point in time. What are the broader structural factors behind this new enthusiasm? How is it connected to changing paradigms in development thinking and the regulation of international migration? How does it relate to the trinity of the market, the state, and the community/civil society? What role is played by changing geo-political formations and new concerns for security and migration control following the demise of the Cold War? And how does this new thinking materialize in relation to different fields and actors related, for instance, to post-conflict reconstruction, knowledge transfer and transnational business?
Three phases of thinking on the migration-development nexus
The fundamental claims associated with the migration-development enthusiasm presented in current academic and policy discourses are not as new as they appear. Looking at the past 60 years, that is, when PROOF development became established as a policy field and as a discourse in both the developed, industrialized world on the one hand and the developing, technologically modernizing and often decolonizing states on the other hand, considerable similarities but also some important shifts in thinking can be observed. From a simple cost-benefit point of view, the original idea posits that the flow of emigrants and the accompanying brain drain are partly or wholly compensated for by a reverse flow of money, ideas and knowledge. Over time, this perspective was challenged by more critical evaluations rejecting the potentials of migration for development. With a slightly different emphasis and with new political instruments, the positive view on potentials has returned. It is not surprising that the conceptualization of the nexus between migration and development mirrors the dominant development paradigms and their changes over the decades with migration always playing an important but changing role. The following three phases can thus be distinguished:
Phase 1: Migration and development -remittances and return
In phase 1, during the 1950s and 1960s, public policy emphasized the need to fill 'labour gaps' in the North with migrant workers and thereby also contribute to 'development' in the South. The latter was supposed to result from financial remittances, return migration and the subsequent transfer of skills and knowledge that this involved (Kindleberger, 1967) . This view corresponded to overall economic modernization concepts in development thinking and to a belief that state capacity could shape economic growth as well as control migration according to national needs. Moreover, it was congruent with the textbook mantra in economics, which suggests that the emigration of surplus labour from underdeveloped areas leads to a new equilibrium between capital and labour (see Lewis, 1954) : if labour goes North, labour scarcities in the South should then attract inflow of capital and, eventually, lead to economic development in the South (cf. Hamilton and Whaley, 1984) . This academic thinking was mirrored in policies: both sending and receiving states of migrant workers articulated the need for temporariness and return based on the expectation that returnees brought new knowledge and qualifications with them. Nonetheless, retrospectively, critical voices asked whether the magnitude of international migration was high enough to have a significant impact in creating labour scarcities in the emigration countries and thus a need for the introduction of more advanced technologies. In addition, it seemed questionable whether financial remittances were of a scale that went beyond consumption and added to an increase in productivity and economic growth (cf. Hermele, 1997) .
Phase 2: Underdevelopment and migration -poverty and the brain drain
In phase 2, during much of the 1970s and 1980s, the term 'development' came to be replaced by 'dependency' as a structural condition of the periphery dominated by the centre, and 'underdevelopment' was seen as its inevitable result. During this period -in which dependency theory and later on world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974) criticized developmentalist modernization theory -the nexus was conceptualized in the reverse. Rather than working from migration to development the assumed causality moved from underdevelopment to migration (see, for example, Portes and Walton, 1981) . Brain drain was one of the most important concerns in this period. In a dependency perspective, underdevelopment led to the loss of the well-educated and most qualified persons, who migrated from the periphery to the centres in the dependent world and, above all, into industrialized countries. This out-migration, in turn, was thought to contribute to even more underdevelopment and increased migration flows through asymmetric distribution of benefits and resources working in favour of the economically developed centres. At the same time, from the early 1970s most European countries started to cut off official recruitment and closed their main gates, keeping only side doors open for selected categories of immigrants. Since less skilled workers found it increasingly difficult to enter the economically advanced countries because of more restricted recruitment schemes, academic and policy attention focused even more on the implications of highly skilled migration.
Although current assessments tend now to highlight positive linkages, evidence for the brain drain thesis is easy to spot nowadays as well. For example, in 2005, between one-third and one-half of the so-called developing world's science and technology personnel lived in OECD countries. Even those views which give a nuanced account of the positive effects through return, investment and educational benefits, observe 'brain strain hotspots' where out-flow is not balanced by counter-flows and thus severely hampers socio-economic development (Lowell, Findlay and Stewart, 2004) . This is the case, for instance, for greater parts of the health sector in sub-Saharan Africa where the World Health Organization warned of the damaging effects of this 'care PROOF drain' (for example , Stilwell, 2004) . In stark contrast to many African countries suffering from brain drain, countries developing quickly along economic lines, such as Taiwan, South Korea and the People's Republic of China, have increasingly managed to re-attract students and experts from abroad and thus could change the situation into 'reverse brain drain' (Zweig, 2006) . These stand at the centre of public attention in this third phase.
Phase 3: Migration and (co)development -the celebration of transnational circulation
We are now observing a third phase which has been underway since the 1990s. In this phase the idea of what in French policy circles has been called co-développement best describes the dominant public policy approaches. This idea puts the migrant at the centre of attention identifying him or her as the development agent par excellence. In this phase the migrant has been constituted as an element of development cooperation. Along with it goes a reversal of the nexus taking us back to a more optimistic view, akin to the 1960s. Again, nowadays, international migration is supposed to fuel development. Most emphasis is placed on financial remittances and many attempts aim at facilitating and channelling individual and collective money transfers. In addition, skills, flows of knowledge and social remittances have also gained significance (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005) . Current initiatives thus cover a wider range of topics around the circulation of people, money and ideas. First, temporary and circular migration are presented as the ideal combination contributing to economic development by way of remittances while at the same time curtailing brain drain through early return and re-insertion. Such perspectives are reflected in many recent policy recommendations, for example those of the Global Commission to increase opportunities for short-term labour migration (GCIM, 2005) . Second, temporary return and brain circulation are among the allegedly new measures. Not only permanent return migration but also temporary stays, shorter visits, and other forms of mobility promoting knowledge transfer are thought to address development issues. For instance, 'diaspora knowledge networks' (Meyer, Chapter 7 in this volume) composed of scientists and R&D personnel, innovative business start-ups (cf. Rauch, 2001) , and professionals working for multinational companies (Kuznetsov, 2006) 
Toward a transnational perspective
While in phase 1 policy-makers and researchers principally looked on remittances and return migration as a way of transferring resources across borders, in phase 2 the overcoming of development was seen as more critical. Now in phase 3, the landscape of alternatives has widened in an era of 'globalization', 'network society' or 'world society'. What we observe is an ever-increasing emphasis on transnational circulation. All of the new initiatives point to the importance of new transnational agents, that is, 'diasporic' actors. The now prevalent paradigm of phase 3 presumes that migrants and other geographically mobile persons, and those with whom they associate, may be engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border practices.
The emergence and activities of these new transnational actors and initiatives require a transnational perspective. Most globalization theories, world system theory and the world polity approach share a perspective on world-spanning structures and world-wide dynamics and thus are helpful in conceiving social structures beyond the national state as part of larger processes. They provide insights into the broader political, economic and cultural opportunity structures within which the relevant agents move. However, they exclusively focus on top-down processes and generally neglect agency, that is, how global processes materialize in local situations and how actors span cross-border networks (Faist, 2010) .
Globalization approaches generally share a bird's-eye view. They take world spanning structures as a point of departure and ask how such structures and associated processes impact and shape lower-level structures and dynamics, for example, on the level of national states and below. In these accounts, the nexus of migration and development is hardly addressed. Even more, migration itself often does not receive great attention and many of the frequently cited works pay scant attention to the mobility of people (Albrow, 2007; Castells, 1996) . If they do, they often portray it in a somewhat romantic way, depicting migrants as smooth interlocutors of cosmopolitan lifestyles (Beck, 2007) . With the exceptions of David Held and his collaborators in their sweeping account of global transformations (Held et al., 1999) , there is an odd silence on the mobility of persons in general and on migration in particular, and their role for concomitant -global and local -societal changes.
In the world polity theory of John W. Meyer and the Stanford School, the global diffusion of ideas, norms and values, that is, world culture, is the starting point. The diffusion of world culture is exogenous to local contexts, worldwide, and based on the premises of modern rationalization in Max Weber's sense (Meyer et al., 1997) . This world culture is rationalistic and the related values and norms constitute cognitive models, such as the three-tiered school system or institutions of development cooperation, which expand world-wide. No account is given to the possibility that models may float only very superficially and provoke contestation and diverging interpretations. Non-governmental organizations, including diaspora associations, often adopt interpretations of development favoured by international organizations such as the World Bank or UNDP. Although actors accept such cognitive models, they may not be ready to act according to the standards prescribed. Needless to say, this also applies to the notions of development and their manifold critiques (Pieterse, 2001) . In essence, world polity theory prioritizes the rational orientation of agents and organizations regarding organizational models. Yet there is no account of how agency modifies the function of such schemes.
In contrast to the globalization and world polity approaches, world systems theory explicitly considers migration and development. Building upon dependency theory (such as Cardoso and Faletto, 1969) world systems theory seeks to delineate the genesis and reproduction of the modern capitalist world economy in successive periods from a macroperspective. The world system can be conceived as a set of mechanisms which redistributes resources from the periphery to the core. In this view, the core is composed of the economically developed part of the world, while the periphery is constituted by its underdeveloped part. There is a fundamental and institutionally stabilized 'division of labour' between core and periphery: while the core has a high level of technological development and manufactures complex products, the role of the periphery is to supply raw materials, agricultural products and cheap migrant labour for the dominating economies of the core. This economic exchange takes place on unequal terms, based on a deeply entrenched power asymmetry: the periphery is forced to sell its products at low prices, but has to buy the core's products at comparatively high prices (Wallerstein, 1974) . The statuses of core and periphery are not, however, mutually exclusive and fixed to certain geographic areas; instead, they are relative to each other and shifting. There is a zone called 'semi-periphery', which acts as a periphery to the core, and a core to the periphery. In the 21st century, this zone would comprise, for example, Eastern Europe, China, India, Brazil and Mexico. A crucial insight to be derived from world systems theory for the analysis of processes across borders is that transnational flows of people, money and goods emerging in the context of migration strongly coincide with the economic and derivative political power asymmetries of the world economy. Dense and continuous transnational flows build upon migration systems (Kritz et al., 1992) which in turn are structured by core-periphery relations. Yet such asymmetries are not sufficient to account for the emergence and reproduction of transnational spaces in which migrants and other agents move.
All of these accounts of social processes beyond the nation-state offer top down views, which define the properties of lower-order systems. Little room is given to local autonomy and agency in this thinking. Moreover, according to such views, it is modern organizations and networks which rule the societal world, which is a functionally differentiated world, while social formations such as families, tribes, clans and communities play a negligible role, if at all. For instance, world polity theory maintains that cognitive models shape the actors although it is also plausible that agents shape the world polity. The very fact that the World Bank has championed the diaspora model of development and the huge amounts of remittances migrants contribute have very real consequences for conceiving development. Nonetheless different agents hold divergent notions of development which change over time (Glick Schiller, Chapter 2 in this volume). In essence, it is not clear why some patterns are more universal than others, while still others are not at all. We can list many local or national patterns which do not necessarily go back to global models. For example, states in the OECD countries historically have employed very different models of incorporating migrants at the national level, ranging from assimilationist to multicultural models. Moreover, there are divergent assessments of migrants' transnational ties -they can be considered beneficial regarding development cooperation, but often also viewed suspiciously by immigration states when it comes to political activities. While former colonial powers with long experience in penetrating developing countries have seized quickly upon the idea of co-development and the engagement of diasporas for development, others, often characterized by historically less intense international ties, have only recently started to think about such models. Examples for the former category are national states such as France, the UK, Spain and the Netherlands, for the latter Germany, Austria and Sweden.
Hence, manifold new forms and assessments of transnational circulations reaching across state borders have emerged. Accordingly, a transnational perspective is required to link both development and migration studies. Such a perspective has to account for processes of cross-border transactions which may concatenate in transnational fields or spaces. These consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that cut across the borders of at least two national states. In other words, the term refers to sustained and continuous pluri-local transactions crossing state borders. Most of these formations are located in between the life-world of personal interactions on the one hand, and the institutionalized fields of the economy, polity, law, science and religion on the other hand. The most basic element of transnational social formations is transactions, that is, bounded communications between social agents such as persons. More aggregated levels encompass groups, organizations and firms. From this perspective, it is an empirical question whether such transnational transactions are of global or regional reach.
Transnational approaches in and beyond migration scholarship certainly do not form a coherent theory or set of theories. Nonetheless they share a focus on migrant agency (Basch et al.,1994) , transnational social structures (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998) , such as transnational communities (Portes et al., 1999) or diasporas (Bauböck and Faist, 2010) . A transnational perspective looks beyond the nation-state without assuming its demise. It is thus able to account for the shaping and differentiating role of state borders for mobility, migration and transnationalization. In so doing, a transnational perspective is suitable for looking both at new social formations sui generis, such as transnational social spaces (see Faist, 2000) , and at how old national institutions acquire new meanings and functions in the process of cross-border transformation. Here, we take a broad transnational view. The contributions to this volume look bottom up as well as at the macro-structures and opportunities setting the frames of transnational action, its causes and consequences, including a global view on unequal dynamics and asymmetric power structures. While some contributions concentrate on macro-structural processes and institutions (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, Chapter 3 and Glick-Schiller, Chapter 2 in this volume), others focus on local structure and agency (Smith, Chapter 5 and Fauser, Chapter 6 in this volume). The aim of this book is not an integrated transnational perspective that coherently connects both macro-and meso-oriented views. Instead, we strive for a critical appraisal of the state of the art in shedding light on the nexus from different vantage points which concern transnational circulations.
Structural transformation and the new migration and development paradigm
The recent discovery of migrants as transnational development agents is embedded in and accompanied by broader structural changes and a paradigmatic shift in relation to the thinking on development and on migration and migrant communities. The macro-structural conditions of this current phase of the migration and development nexus shifted significantly. In addition, the changes in the political and discursive structures need to be considered: first, the constitution of the relationships between the state, the market, and civil society and community established in development thinking; second, geo-political changes since the end of the Cold War and the new political role of diasporas; and, third, the securitization of migration accompanying the discourses and measures favouring circulatory migration and migrants' transnational engagement. The elements of this new paradigm are also reflected in the agency of organizations, networks and other actors and the ways states deal with these.
Structural transformation
The chapters take different views on how structural transformation can be imagined rather than following a uniform approach. What all of them hold in common is a historical view (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, Chapter 3 and Glick Schiller, Chapter 2 in this volume). A socio-historical transformation perspective, inspired by classical works such as Karl Polanyi's ([1944] 1968) The Great Transformation (implicitly) underlies most contributions. What is particularly inspiring in this work on European transformations from the 18th to the 20th centuries is its viewpoint on broad changes based upon a historical analysis of the political and economic macro-processes ending up in the catastrophe PROOF of Nazism. Here, social transformation refers to a fundamental shift in the way societal life is organized. This shift goes beyond the continual processes of incremental social change that are always at work. It refers to a kind of change in which all existing social patterns are questioned and many reconfigured. Polanyi took the rise of market liberalism in the 19th century as his point of departure. In the 21st century, economic but also political and cultural globalization and new patterns of international political and military power are reshaping the world. Taking this work as inspiration, the contributions to this volume revolve around the present global reconstitution of capital and structures of power, migration and development.
The chapters by Raúl Delgado Wise and Humberto Márquez (3) Covarrubias and by Nina Glick Schiller (2) both offer alternative readings to the current migration-development discussion which ignores the ways in which it is linked to global political-economic transformations. Both contributions emphasize the importance of the neo-liberal transformation of the world economy based on a critique of imperialism by Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias and from a 'global power perspective' by Glick Schiller. Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias start with a portrait of uneven development and seek to place the migration-development nexus within an interpretation of accumulation. They contend that labour migration plays a crucial role in the destruction of national accumulation patterns and the evolution of a global accumulation regime. According to this view the emergence of a huge surplus population results in structurally 'forced migration'. This surplus pool for migrants is an inevitable product of the globalization of capital accumulation. The massive transfer of human resources from emigration to immigration regions is in no way compensated for by financial remittances. The current enthusiasm for migrant remittances renders invisible the prior and much more substantial resource transfer. In their view this imbalance becomes evident in the US-Mexican case in which instruments such as maquila investments and production simply paper over the fact that the import of most parts used in maquila production is an 'indirect export of labour'. The indirect export results in a net transfer of profits to the US economy. All of this further dismantles the productive apparatus in Mexico. Regarding the direct export of labour, they point out the deleterious effects on the Mexican countryside through a receding infrastructure due to depopulation. In stark contrast to the current enthusiasm, Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias do not regard migrants as active agents of transformation per se in this global accumulation regime. In their view, only by connecting migrant associations to those organizations promoting a social transformation agenda can the paradoxes of the current migration-development nexus be unveiled.
Nina Glick Schiller is more sanguine about the possibilities of migrant agency since she also looks at practices in everyday life. She considers the current dynamics of the migration-development nexus not as a top-down process in which macro-structural constraints determine local agency but as the mutual constitution of the local and the global. She starts with an interpretation of global discourses around migration and development which privilege interpretations along nation-state perspectives. As an alternative she introduces a 'global power perspective'. This entails looking at migrant remittances in the frame of neo-liberal restructuring of national economies; for example, remittances may fill voids left by cutbacks in social services and protection. At the same time, attention must also be focused upon migrants who form networks across borders and establish trans-locally specific patterns of remittancesending, which result in changing patterns of winners and losers in the global remittance economy. Glick Schiller goes a step beyond politicaleconomic considerations and conceptualizes the cultural dimension by pointing out, for example, that the 'dehumanization' of migrant activities in the informal sector and the concomitant focus on circular and contract labour further contributes to the neo-liberal transformation of the labour regime through a politics of difference between 'us' and 'them'. The dehumanization goes even further, as evidenced by a 'politics of fear' which portrays migrants as a security risk to entities such as the European Union. Glick Schiller argues that the more states in both North and South are hollowed out as delivering infrastructural needs to their citizens, the more they are keen to provide national identity.
Underlying the new paradigm: changing concepts of statehood, market and civil society
Below the level of macro-structural transformations, this phase also involves shifts concerning the relationship between state(hood), market and civil society/community.
The criticism of the 'civil religion' of development from the 1980s onward has called into question the idea of a homogeneous Third World, notions of progress (Rist, 1996) and, most important for our inquiry, relations between the state and civil society and community (Schuurman, 2000) . The changing conceptualizations of the state, the market and civil society over the past 50 years in the development debate may signal a transnationalization of these terms. This can be usefully illustrated in the relationship between, first, the state and civil society and community and, second, the market and civil society and community (Faist, 2008) . Overall, development thinking has moved from a focus on the national state to more emphasis on local government and international institutions. Therefore, we have to broaden our concepts and speak not simply of 'the state' but of 'statehood' on various levels. Moreover, as the enthusiasm over the concepts of diasporas and transnational communities indicates, civil society also has to be conceptualized as a transnational civil society.
Statehood and civil society
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s modernization theory guided a belief in the central role of the national developmental state. Strong state bureaucracies and developmental dictatorships were the privileged actors in promoting industrialization, modern education, literacy and modernist thinking. A partial shift throughout the 1970s toward basic needs strategies targeting increasing poverty and malnutrition brought more attention to still rather diffuse notions of community and civil society in the search for grass-roots and self-help initiatives. In addition, lower levels of government have gained importance here as well. In the face of decentralization and its attendant slogans, such as 'ownership' and 'stakeholder-ship', local governments, along with civil society and community, have assumed a greater role.
It has been in this context that migrants were introduced in the 1990s as a civil society or community actor, either as individuals remitting funds or as migrant associations in the form of diasporic or transnational communities. In immigration states such as France vis-à-vis West African states, the aforementioned idea of co-development in phase 3 of the migration-development nexus sees migrants as their own development agents regarding sending countries. From this perspective, migrants and their diasporas alleviate poverty and help to solve conflicts, especially if local governments work with diaspora groups to deliver better results. Beyond France, examples can be found in Spain and Italy, but also in the UK and the Netherlands. This focus on local authorities and diasporas has come to be especially relevant in situations where decentralization, community development, and civil society participation have generally gained importance, whether as a result of new policies or as a reflection of the fact that many national states in the 'Third World' had barely managed to establish territorial domination and the rule of law, to institutionalize democracy, or to launch sustained economic development. Here, hope is invested in the prospect of non-governmental organizations and local governments working in a synergetic collaboration with diasporas.
The market and transnational civil society
Not only have statehood-civil society relations changed but so, too, have the linkages between the market and civil society. Communities and civil society are becoming more and more a complement to liberal economic approaches in the era of the post-Washington Consensus. The notion of social capital as touted, for example, by the World Bank, is the very fusion of market-oriented with civil society thought: Social resources, such as trust and networks of reciprocity, are seen as economically and politically productive elements. Two fundamentally different views are to be found -liberal economic thought on the one hand, and participatory approaches on the other. Yet both favour migrant agency for development. The first line emphasizes the 'market' migrant, the second the 'political' migrant. Liberal economic thought would suggest that migrants are their own best development agents. A UK House of Commons report (2004) touting diasporas as development agents approvingly cites John Kenneth Galbraith (Galbraith, 1979 , p. 7), who described migration as 'the oldest action against poverty'. The commitment of transnational migrants to their regions of origin is seen as compatible with the concept of the 'market citizen,' who is not necessarily a political citizen. This focus on the economically entrepreneurial citizen in the market is opposite to the politically active citizen in grassroots perspectives. This second 'political' approach is reflected in the fact that participatory approaches, as expressed, for example, by a UNDP report (2002, p. 1), focus on collective remittances. In line with this, migrants' collectives in all forms -hometown associations, diaspora knowledge networks, businesspersons' networks and even religious congregations -are addressed by governments. These broader changes, and public discourses on the migration-development nexus in particular, are thus a decisive element of how the linkage of migrationdevelopment has gained ground in policy debates (Faist, Chapter 8 in this volume).
Geo-political changes: the new role of diasporas
Migrants' opportunities to voice political viewpoints concerning their homelands changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. In PROOF the 1960s, lobbying activities of diasporas mainly took the form of protests against the domestic policies of governments in the homelands (Armstrong, 1976) . Cold War rivalries largely dictated the effectiveness of these diasporic anti-government campaigns (Shain and Barth, 2003) . During the Cold War, Western countries maintained fairly open refugee policies (compared to the post-Cold War era) and supported diaspora groups who formed opposition to unfriendly regimes, such as the support of the US government for Cuban exile groups. Currently, although national liberation diasporas (Kurds, Tamils, Palestinians and so forth) are still ongoing, their activities have become more varied; for example, some diasporas have portrayed themselves as carriers of human rights. Even in the context of armed conflict and civil wars, diasporas have assumed a more visible role. Increasingly, 'diasporas' are acknowledged actors in financial, economic, political and social support in post-conflict reconstruction, peace building and (re)democratization in their homelands from which they had once fled -as is the case with Afghanistan, for instance (von Carlowitz, 2004) . This is embedded in a broader shift in the perspectives on conflict held by development agencies. Conflicts along with the refugee movements and diasporas these produced are now seen as an opportunity to rebuild political and economic structures without carrying the burden of previous malfunctioning structures, while bringing new concepts and experiences from the stable and democratic host countries (Van Hear, Chapter 4 in this volume). The new propensity of international organizations such as the World Bank to see the opportunities rather than the risks of post-conflict reconstruction seems to be somewhat reminiscent of Schumpeter's 'gales of creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1976 (Schumpeter, [1942 ).
The coupling of migration control and development aid
The debates around the migration-development nexus are also connected to concerns for security, migration control and a coupling of migration management and development aid. One of the fundamental ideas at the core of the current debates and efforts is that an increase in development leads to a decrease in migration. The current efforts to control migration flows and borders in Europe are thus reflected in this debate. A number of initiatives on bilateral and multilateral levels, in particular within the European Union, closely bring together development cooperation; cooperation in the management of migration between countries of origin, destination and transit; the fight against irregular migration; return and re-admission agreements; and the synergies of migration and development, in particular with regard to remittances (Fauser, 2008) . Since the European Council's Presidency Conclusion of the Tampere summit in the year 1999 the collaboration of third countries in the management of migration is closely linked to international cooperation, trade and aid. In general, partnerships with third countries, in particular at the European periphery, are based on policies which make development aid conditional upon their willingness to collaborate in combating irregular migration (Faist and Ette, 2007) . The Cotonou Agreement, for instance, regulating the partnership of the European Union with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in matters of development cooperation, economic trade and political dimensions foresees the return and readmission 'of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union, at that Member State's request and without further formalities' (Council of the European Union, 2005). Moreover, in this phase, development cooperation is tied to migration management not only on the international level, but also to local initiatives involving local governments and migrant communities (Fauser, Chapter 6 in this volume).
New paradigms -organizations, networks, states
The activities of organizations and the positioning of agents within networks constitute a strategic research site in which we see social transformation at work. The constitution of diaspora as development agents, and the interface of migrant associations with development organizations and with local, state and international agencies thus present an opportunity to observe the impact of structural changes in the migration-development nexus. There is no single logic which structures this field. Yet we can see that states and organizations on various levels seize upon opportunities to engage in connecting international migration to development cooperation.
Many emigration states have repositioned themselves due to global changes since the late 1980s. Public policies and the corresponding semantics have changed. A prominent example of the transformed political semantics involves the discursive and institutional changes that the People's Republic of China has implemented. Discursively, the slogan to 'serve the country' (wei guo fuwu) has replaced the previous motto, 'return to serve' (huiguo fuwu) (Cheng Xi in Nyíri, 2001, p. 637) . Such rhetoric has been complemented by public policy changes. Examples abound including adaptations through mechanisms such as dual citizenship for emigrants and immigrants (Faist and Ette, 2007) , voting rights for absentees, tax incentives for citizens abroad, and co-optation of migrant organizations by local, regional and state governments for development cooperation. Instead of permanent return migration, temporary returns, visits and other forms of transactions have moved to the centre of attention. As already shown, in this third phase of the nexus, the perspective of migrants' return as the asset to development has been complemented by the idea that even if there is no eventual return, the commitment of migrants living abroad could be tapped through business incentives, hometown associations, or 'diaspora knowledge networks' (Barré et al., 2003; Meyer, Chapter 7 in this volume) . Such measures also include the channelling of remittances into productive investment and infrastructure development. The most prominent example in this respect is the Mexican federal government's tres-por-uno (3x1) programme, in which each 'migra-dollar' sent back by migrants living abroad is complemented by three dollars from various governmental levels to go toward regional development projects. More recently, Mexican banks have joined the fray and announced 4x1 programs (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005) . In addition to the efforts by migrant-sending countries to attract investment of their citizens abroad, receiving states have also discovered migrant communities and diasporas as development agents.
Engaging with the diaspora for the benefit of development has thus become an important strategy of many immigration states (De Haas, 2006) . Cooperation with the diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building has moved onto the agendas of development agencies, where previously skepticism and fear as to their conflict-fuelling role had dominated (Van Hear, Chapter 4 in this volume). In the same line, co-development policies address migrant communities and organizations in order to support their transnational engagements for their hometowns and countries (Fauser, Chapter 6 in this volume) . These initiatives by development agencies, national governments and local authorities are intended to promote the observed engagement of migrants themselves.
Throughout the past two decades, scholars have also observed a growth in transnational initiatives by migrant collectives and individuals living abroad. A growing number of knowledge networks by highly skilled migrants have come into existence (Meyer, Chapter 7 in this volume) . There is a spread of hometown associations, best documented for the Mexican communities located in the United States (Goldring, 2002; Orozco, 2004) , but also among established Turkish immigrants in Germany, where transnational organizations are newly emerging (Çaglar, 2006) , and similar dynamics can be observed in relation to many migrant groups in recent immigrant places in Southern Europe (Fauser, Chapter 6 in this volume) . Moreover, migrants engage in transnational activities not only in such formally organized ways. On an individual level transnational networks emerge between emigrants and those at home. These are not restricted to family and kinship networks, but may involve a variety of relationships considered useful or necessary for the establishment of local and transnational businesses. Such enterprises are, moreover, not only initiated by migrants abroad, but also constitute a strategy activated by those 'at home' (Smith, Chapter 5 in this volume) .
The chapters of this book dealing with the changing paradigms and organizational activities cover a wide range of related issues, yet all of them speak to the efforts of how collective agents -migrant associations and diasporas -situate themselves within the changing landscape of opportunities offered by the migration-development nexus: diaspora organizations in post-conflict settings (Van Hear, Chapter 4 in this volume), migrant associations in co-development policies (Fauser, Chapter 6 in this volume), diaspora knowledge networks (Meyer, Chapter 7 in this volume) and networks of relatives and friends in economic entrepreneurship (Smith, Chapter 5 in this volume) . These case studies span a multitude of endeavours which constitute distinct facets of transnational spaces in the migration-development nexus.
The contributions by Nicholas Van Hear and Jean-Baptiste Meyer (chapters 4 and 7) both deal with diaspora options with respect to migration and development. While Van Hear discusses the function of diaspora in post-conflict development, Meyer appraises the 'diaspora option' in contrast to an assumed 'return option', that is, emigrants returning 'home'. Van Hear's analysis refers to the broad political and economic transformations which characterize the rather optimistic evaluation of diasporas' potential for mediation and reconstruction in 'conflict-ridden' societies. First, as he argues, geo-political changes and interventions of external powers into the politics of 'failing' and 'failed' states have contributed to the perception of diaspora in its new role as a mediator. Second, Van Hear argues that the policy priorities of international organizations such as the World Bank have somewhat shifted from a neo-liberal agenda epitomized by the Washington Consensus to what he calls a 'liberal agenda'. Rather than exclusively demanding the implementation of market principles, emphasis is now put on providing institutions appropriate for implementing these principles, such as the drive toward good governance. Along these lines, development organizations now embrace the idea that 'post-conflict settings' offer chances for socio-economic and political reconstruction and development. In this context perspectives on diaspora have also shifted in governments and international organizations. Previously the emphasis had been largely on the flight of unwanted people and their conflict-spurning role from abroad. Now, international agents frequently consider them a means for economic and political stability and an instrument of social security across borders. Diaspora then becomes an element of (transnationalizing) civil society. These positive evaluations of diaspora on development are also at the core of Meyer's analysis. He seeks to account for the differential success of so-called Diaspora Knowledge Networks (DKN), the importance and effectiveness of some networks, and the precarious life of others. Meyer draws on examples from around the world (India, China, South Africa and Colombia) to specify the role of DKN as brokers or mediators for the promotion of development from abroad. They not only provide a bridge between expatriates and the home country -they also constitute transnational formations in their own right. Taking this perspective, Meyer investigates their contribution for national development schemes. In addition, Meyer suggests that DKNs reflect global transformations affecting the organization of economic and scientific knowledge in a globalized world.
The chapters by Lothar Smith and Margit Fauser (5 and 6 respectively) look primarily at one of the two sides of transnational resource chainsthe former on on transnational resource flows in the emigration context and the latter on transnationally active migrant associations in an immigration country. In a detailed analysis of migrant organizations' practices in Madrid and Barcelona, Margit Fauser looks for the various ways in which migrant associations are constituted as new agents in the realm of migration and development, called co-development. Locallocal transactions across borders provide the mainstay of such activities. Of prime importance is her finding that migration and development policies on the one hand and incorporation policies on the other hand form intricate webs. These efforts envision incorporation into the receiving society both a pre-condition and a result of migrants' engagement with their home towns resulting from the institutional exchange, knowledge, skills and self-esteem acquired through this endeavour. This new constellation not only adds to more complicated social and political entanglements across borders and thus also speaks to the networks of migrants and their associations (see also Glick Schiller, Chapter 2 in this volume), but is also evidence that a transnational perspective is called for. This insight also guides Lothar Smith's analysis of transnational business in the case of Accra in Ghana. In developing a typology of transnational business, he starts with the economic opportunity structure created by neo-liberal structural adjustment policies which gave a boost to small-scale business activities. Smith points to the situatedness of migrant entrepreneurship beyond the structural dimension: he offers an analysis of the role and involvement of (relatively immobile) urban actors as business partners of migrants abroad. Not only do the networks which connect both reach beyond family and kinship circles; transnational business is also not only an investment of migrants in the event of return. Urban actors often took the first step initiating the business relationship. One of the insights gained from both Fauser and Smith is the need to pay more attention to the role of non-migrant actors and institutions as they contribute to transnationalization.
Conclusion
A transnational perspective calls into question central assumptions which have re-appeared in the newest round of the migrationdevelopment nexus, for example, that migration is one of the central keys to removing structural constraints to economic growth, social wellbeing and stronger democracy. The results of the myriad studies on the consequences of remittances are inconclusive at best. Going further, the migration-development nexus is part of the ongoing structural transformation of politics, economics and culture worldwide. On the basis of the scepticism arising from these findings the contributions to this volume collectively emphasize the need to rethink the assumptions underlying the migration-development nexus and a careful analysis of both structural changes and agency.
In doing so the chapters to follow examine both (macro-)structural constraints in which migration and development processes are tied, such as the reorganization of the global economy along with national economies, and meso-level agency in networks and organizations. The goal is to paint various parts of a picture which captures changing paradigms in national, local and global institutions, both institutional and discursive. A transnational perspective, which focuses attention on the interlocking webs of international and national development organizations, international organizations, national states and migrant associations and networks, provides a roadmap for this wide-ranging terrain of structural transformation. Eventually, the migration-development nexus can be seen as a specific instance of the 'transnational social question' which reflects the perception of stark social inequalities around the world -within and across the borders of nation-states (Faist, 2009) . All perspectives taken in the field of migration and development, including such a transnational optic, need to be self-reflexive about their role beyond academia and particularly in public discourse. Thomas Faist (Chapter 8 in this volume) reminds us that most researchers one-sidedly focus on the question of how to influence policy either by consulting politicians or supporting social movements. In general, the question has been whether and in what ways social scientific research may form a basis for rational political decisions. Faist argues that such questions are misleading. Social scientific research may instead offer crucial stimuli for describing, understanding and explaining the migration-development nexus. This means that sociological analysis of the theory-praxis link should go beyond the focus on research and policy and bring in much more productively social scientists' role in the public sphere. It is through ideas as conduits for thinking and policy that researchers have the greatest impact in public life.
In his conclusion to this book Peter Kivisto (Chapter 9) argues that theories of development have reflected not only general theoretical trends (such as functionalism in the 1950s and 1960s) but also the political contexts of their time. Quite strikingly, ideas and theories of development after World War Two not only occurred in the fight against Communism during the World War but also constituted an effort to reshape the relations to (former) colonies. Moreover, they harboured Eurocentric concepts of development which held that the historical patterns in the West would be the routes to economic, political and social development for rest of the world. Concepts linking development and migration in the 1960s followed this pattern in that they reinforced dominant representations of modern vs. traditional societies. For example, migrants were not only supposed to remit money but also acquire the right kind of work ethic while working abroad. Yet while we already have some knowledge of the discourses around the migration-development nexus, we are only at the start of understanding the economic, political and cultural outcomes for the regions and groups involved. Bank 29, 59, 192, [199] [200] world culture 9 world polity approach 8 world polity theory 9 world system theory [6] [7] [8] [9] 191 
